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Technical Change And British Naval Policy 1860-1939
Britain built her navy in the first era as befitted the pre-dominant world power and she maintained her navy in the second era as befitted her circumstances of industrial and economic decline. The first four chapters of this book cover that first era and the second three cover the later period.
The first chapter, by the editor Ranft, has as its subject the protection of British seaborne trade and the development of systematic planning for war 1860 to 1906. The real technical change issue treated here is why British naval opinion and direction determined that the convoy system, used relatively effectively for high value transport in the age of sail, was unsuitable for the age of steam and iron. It is clear, at least from Ranft's account, that an obsession with the "offensive" and a commitment to the close blockade as the heart of British naval strategy overwhelmed any historical study and discouraged any significant numerical calculation.
The second rather short chapter, by Alan Cowpe, covers the Royal Navy and the Whitehead torpedo. It makes clear that the RN did pay significant technical attention to this weapon and its potential leading to the considerable development of torpedo boats, torpedo boat destroyers and destroyers and their integration into the total fleet strategy. This essay takes us to the end of the 1880s with the RN in what Cowpe regards as a generally correct posture relative to this new weapon.
The third, more lengthy chapter, by Hugh Lyon, explores the relationship between the Admiralty and private industry in the development of warships covering most fully the first era mentioned above. This essay is quite complete and well considered with deep research that, in my view, has only now been surpassed as an overall survey with the recent publication of The Battleship Builders by Johnston and Buxton. The essay makes clear that the RN depended on private industry for most all of what we would now call research and development.
The fourth, also short, chapter, by Phillip Towle, discusses the evaluation of the experience of the Russo-Japanese war in formulation of British naval thought. It shows, somewhat sadly, that the lessons learned from assessment of what were a relatively well known and objectively knowable set of events most depended on what pond you were in, the Fishpond or that of his critics.
The next chapter by David Henry moves into the second era to consider British submarine, and anti-submarine, policy between the wars. Henry makes a general case that British submarine procurement was directionally correct and limitations in numbers were only due to overall financial restraints.
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